In this paper we analyse the set of scalar algebraic Riccati equations ARE that play a n important role in nding feedback Nash equilibria of the scalar N-player linear-quadratic di erential game. We show that in general there exist maximal 2 N , 1 solutions of the ARE that give rise to a Nash equilibrium. In particular we analyse the number of equilibria as a function of the state-feedback parameter and present both necessary and su cient conditions for existence of a unique solution of the ARE. Furthermore, we derive conditions under which the set of state-feedback parameters for which there is a unique solution grows with the number of players in the game.
I. Introduction
During the last decade there has been an increasing interest to study several problems in economics using a dynamic game theoretical setting. In particular in the area of environmental economics and macro-economic policy coordination this is a very natural framework to model problems see e.g. Engwerda et al. 1999 -a for references. In, e.g., policy coordination problems usually two basic questions arise i.e., rst, are policies coordinated and, second, which information do the participating parties have. Usually both these points are rather unclear and, therefore, strategies for di erent possible scenarios are calculated and compared with eachother. One of these scenarios is the so-called feedback Nash scenario see Ba sar and Olsder 1999 for a precise de nition and survey of relevant literature. Note that, since according this scenario the participating parties can react to eachother's policies, its economic relevance is mostly larger than that of the open-loop Nash scenario. In particular the feedback Nash scenario is very popular in studying problems where the underlying model can be described by a set of linear di erential equations and the individual objectives, the parties are striving for, can be approximated by functions which quadratically penalize deviations from some equilibrium targets. Under the assumption that the parties only have a nite-planning horizon, this problem was rst analyzed by Starr and Ho in 1969 see also Lukes 1971 for a result on uniqueness within the class of a ne memoryless strategies. In this paper we study the in nite-planning horizon case and concentrate here on solving the with this problem associated algebraic Riccati equations. In Weeren et al. 1999 it was shown that in the two-player scalar case these equations have either one or three solutions which solve the optimization problem see also Engwerda 1999 -b for a detailed study under which conditions on the system parameters these di erent situations occur. In this paper we study the general N-player scalar case. We show that for any n umber N of players there exists a positive n umber such that if the state-feedback parameter is larger than this number, there exist in general 2 N , 1 solutions for the ARE equations yielding a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we give both necessary and su cient conditions under which there is exact one solution for the ARE equations. We also show that this situation is more likely to occur in case the number of players grows. The outline of the paper is as follows. In section two w e start by stating the problem analysed in this paper. Section three analyzes the solutions of the algebraic Riccati equations. These results are used in section four to nd necessary and su cient conditions for existence of a unique solution. Section ve presents some results on the e ect on the uniqueness conditions of an increase of the number of players in the game. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
II. Problem statement
In this paper we consider the problem where N parties henceforth called players try to 2 minimize their individual quadratic performance criterion. Each player controls a di erent set of inputs to a single system. The system is described by the following di erential equation
Here x is the state of the system, u i is a control variable player i can manipulate, x 0 is the arbitrarily chosen initial state of the system, a the state feedback parameter and b i ; i = 1 ; ::; N are constant system parameters, and _ x denotes the time derivative o f x . The performance criterion player i = 1 ; ::; N aims to minimize is: J i u 1 ; ::; u N : = 1 2
We assume that both q i and r ii are positive and b i di ers from zero. In this paper we consider the existence of limiting stationary feedback Nash equilibria of this di erential game.
To that end we consider the following set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations ARE: a , N X j=1 k j s j k i + k i a , N X j=1 s j k j + q i + k i s i k i = 0 ; i = 1 ; ::; N; 2 where s i := b i r ,1 ii b i . Given our assumptions on the system parameters one can immediately deduce from Ba sar and Olsder 1999, proposition 6.8 that: Then the stationary feedback policies u i = ,r ,1 ii b i k i x 3 i = 1 ; ::; N, provide a Nash equilibrium, leading to the cost J i u 1 ; ::; u N : = x 0 k i x 0 , for player i. Moreover, the resulting system dynamics described by _ x = a cl x; x0 = x 0 , with a cl := a , P N i=1 s i k i , is asymptotically stable. 2
In fact, we conclude from Weeren et al 1999, corollary 3.1 that when the players are restricted at the outset to memoryless strategies cf. Lukes 1971 then existence of a positive solution to the above scalar Riccati equations is a both necessary and su cient condition for existence of a feedback Nash equilibrium. A natural question which arises is how many solutions the above set of algebraic Riccati equations ARE have. To analyze this question we i n troduce for notational convenience the variables: i := s i q i and i := s i k i ; i = 1 ; ::; N; and N +1 = ,a cl : 3 Using this notation 2 can be rewritten as 2 i , 2 N +1 i + i = 0 ; i = 1 ; ::; N: 4 The above question can therefore be reformulated as under which conditions the above N quadratic equations and the equation
have a positive solution i ; i = 1 ; ::; N + 1 .
In the next section we will study this problem in detail.
III. The solution set
We will assume, without loss of generality, that the i 's satisfy 1 To study the number of solutions to these equations, we i n troduce the next recursively Furthermore, it is obvious from this relationship that the number of solutions to ARE coincides with the number of solutions to the equation
14 For the moment, concentrate on the 2-player case. It is easily veri ed that the above equation 14 has then the following algebraic structure fa 0 ; a 1 ; a 2 : = a 0 , a 1 , a 2 a 0 + a 1 , a 2 a 0 , a 1 + a 2 a 0 + a 1 + a 2 = 0 : 15
The structure of f for the general N-player case is similar and is omitted in order to avoid unnecessary cumbersome notation. From this it is not di cult to see that f only has quadratic entries. That is, more precisely, Lemma 2: fa 0 ; ::; a N is a sum of terms, where each term consists of N i=0 a 2k i i for some nonnegative integers k i satisfying P N i=0 2k i = 2 N . Proof:
It is easily veri ed that f,a 0 ; a 1 ; ::; a N = , 1 2 N fa 0 ; ::; a N = f a 0 ; ::; a N and, also, fa 0 ; ::; ,a i ; ::; a N = f a 0 ; ::; a i ; ::; a N ; for any i 2 1; ::; N:
Now, assume that f has a term in which, e.g., a 0 has an odd exponent. Then, collect all terms of f containing odd exponents in a 0 . As a consequence f = a 0 ga 0 ; ::; a N + h a 0 ; ::; a N , where in all terms of both g and h a 0 appears with an even exponent. Since f,a 0 ; a 1 ; ::; a N = f a 0 ; a 1 ; ::; a N w e conclude immediately from this that g must be zero. The rest of the proof follows then straightforwardly.
2
Using this lemma we can then easily derive the following result on the number of solutions to the ARE equations Theorem 3:
ARE always has at least one and at most 2 N , 1 positive solutions.
Proof:
Consider equation 14. Let a 0 := n , 1x , a and a i := p x 2 , i . With this notation, equation 14 coincides with 15. According lemma 2 this equation is a polynomial in x of degree 2 N .
Next, we show that this polynomial has at most 2 N , 1 roots larger than p 1 . T o that end we rst note that f can be rewritten as f = 2 N , 2 i =1 a 0 , a 1 + g i a 0 + a 1 + g i a 0 , a 1 , g i a 0 + a 1 , g i ;
where g i is a linear combination with coe cients +1 or ,1 of a 2 ; ::; a N .
From 16 we immediately h a v e that f = 2 N , 2 i =1 a 2 0 , a 1 + g i 2 a 2 0 , a 1 , g i 2 : Now a t x = p 1 , a 1 = 0. Therefore we conclude that at x = p 1 , f = 2 N , 2 i =1 a 2 0 , g i 2 2 0: Furthermore, it is easily veri ed that except for the term a 0 , P N i=1 a i , all terms a 0 a 1 g i in 16 are positive i f x ! 1 . Therefore, the leading term x 2 N of the polynomial has a negative sign. So, we conclude that the polynomial has always a root located at the lefthandside of p 1 . Or stated di erently, ARE has at most 2 N , 1 positive solutions.
To see that ARE always has at least one solution, we study the To get an impression how the number of solutions of ARE varies with the state parameter a, w e s k etched in gure 1 for the three player case the curves f 3 i . Figure 1 : The curves f 3 i for 1 = 9 ; 2 = 8 ; 3 = 5 : F rom this gure we see, by counting the number of points of the di erent curves f 3 i which h a v e level a, that the number of solutions of ARE increases monotonically from 1 to 7 as a function of a. That this monotonicity does in general not hold is illustrated by the next gure 2, where we plotted for di erent parameter values f 3 2 and f 3 3 . Since f 3 1 is a monotonically decreasing function and f 3 i x f 3 3 x for i 3 as we will show later on see lemma 7, we see that the number of solutions rst increases from 1 to 3 and then drops back to 1 before it increases again.
In particular note from these examples that an even number of solutions occurs only at isolated points for a, whereas an uneven number of solutions occurs at intervals for a. We will not elaborate this subject further here, but it seems that this property holds in general. Then the question as whether 17 has a nite number of zero's can be rephrased whether P N i=1 a i x = 0 has a nite number of zero's. To prove that this is the case, we restrict for the moment to the case N = 3 . H o w the general case can be proved will be clear from this. So, we h a v e to prove that a 1 + a 2 + a 3 = 0 has only a nite number of zero's. Like i n 15 we consider now the following function fa 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 : = a 1 , a 2 , a 3 a 1 + a 2 , a 3 a 1 , a 2 + a 3 a 1 + a 2 + a 3 = 0 :
Obviously, a 1 + a 2 + a 3 = 0 has a nite number of zero's, if f has a nite number of zero's. However, from lemma 2 w e know that f is a polynomial which degree is at most 8. So, f has at most 8 zero's, which proves the claim. 2
Next, consider f N 2 x. By di erentiating f N 2 x it is easily veri ed that f N 2 x will be monotonically increasing for all x x 1 for some number x 1 p 1 . F urthermore, since lim x!1 f N 2 x = 1 and f N 2 x is bounded from above on the interval p 1 ; x 1 , it follows that there exists a positive n umber a 1 such that for all a a 1 the equation f N 2 x = a has exactly one solution. A similar reasoning holds for all the other f N i x; i = 2 ; ::; 2 N see also gure 1 for a visualization in case N = 3. Next, take the maximum over all a i . Since according lemma 4 for a xed a the solutions for f N i x = a di er for all i if a is chosen large enough, it is easily veri ed that the corresponding solutions 1 ; :::; N to 4,5 will also di er. So, it is clear then that the next conclusion holds Theorem 5: Assume that i di er. Then, there exists a positive n umberâ such that for every state feedback parameter a â the set of algebraic Riccati equations 2 has 2 N ,1 positive solutions.
Remark 6:
In case the i do not di er, it is easily veri ed from the above analysis that a similar conclusion holds. That is, there exists a numberâ such that for all a â the number of solutions to ARE does not increase anymore. This number equals the number of distinct ultimately monotonically increasing functions f N i . Without providing a formal proof we note that if one denotes by s the number of i 's that coincide, some carefull counting shows that this number of solutions is 
IV. Uniqueness conditions
In this section we will give both necessary and su cient conditions under which ARE will have a unique solution. To solve this problem, we study the functions f N i as de ned 8 in 7,8 in some more detail. First we note that By di erentiating 11 it is obvious that f N 1 x is a strict monotonically decreasing function. Furthermore, it is easily veri ed in the same way that all other functions f N i x are strictly monotonically increasing for all x x 1 for some x 1 . In the next theorem we will use this together with the previous lemma to derive conditions under which the ARE will have only one poitive solution. But, rst, we i n troduce a convention w.r.t. local versus global extrema. With a local extremum we mean an extremum which o ccurs somewhere on the open interval p 1 ; 1; whereas for the de nition of a global extremum we take the whole domain of de nition p 1 ; 1:
Furthermore, we need some technical results presented in the next lemma. where the last inequality follows from the facts that 1 Proof: First consider the case that f N 2 x is monotonically increasing. Since f N 1 x is strict monotonically decreasing and f N 1 p 1 = f N 2 p 1 , it is obvious from the fact that f N i x f N 3 x; i= 4 ; ::; 2 N see lemma 7 that for a xed a there will be only one intersection point with the functions f N i x if and only if a is smaller than the global minimum of f N 3 x see e.g. gure 1. Next, consider the case that f N 2 x is not monotonically increasing. According lemma 8.ii, f N 2 x has then a local maximum and a local minimum. F urthermore, see lemma 8.i and iii this local minimum is located at the lefthandside of the local minimum of f N 3 x see gure 2 for an illustration of this situation. Since f N 3 x f N 2 x it is clear that for all a smaller than the local minimum of f N 2 x, there will be only one intersection point with the di erent f N i . O b viously, when a is located between the local minimum and the local maximum of f N 2 x there will be three solutions. In case the local minimum of f N 3 x is larger than the local maximum value of f N 2 x, the number of solutions drops, again, to 1. If a is larger than this local minimum of f N 3 x, there will always be at least one intersection point with f N 2 x and one with f N 3 x, which concludes the proof. 2
Remark 10:
In case 1 = 2 , f N 2 x and f N 3 x coincide. Moreover, at p 1 , f N i x; i= 1 ; ::; 4 coincide. From this it is easily seen that there will be exact one intersection point o f a with all these functions if and only if a is smaller than the global minimum of f N 2 x in fact this inequality has to be strict in case f N 2 x has a local minimum which is then also the global one.
2
In the following gure we illustrate, for xed i , the two possibilities that can occur for the set of parameters a for which there is a unique equilibrium 0 a 1 a 2 a 1 1 3 ! m m eq. 0 a 1 a 2 a 3 a 4 a 1 1 3 1 3 ! m m eq. Here m 2 N , 1 denotes the maximum number of solutions.
We conclude this section with three related issues.
First we like to mention that in case 1 A second related issue is that for all a p 1 , p 1 , 2 there will always be a unique solution too. To show this, rst note from theorem 8 that whenever a minimum f N 2 , there will be a unique solution to the ARE. It is easily veri ed that f 2 2 is monotonically increasing and therefore its minimum is given by f 2
x, the rest of the argument follows by induction. Finally, the third issure we like to address is that in Engwerda 1999-b it was shown, for the two player case, that the additional requirement that amongst all ARE solutions we look for a solution which minimizes aggregate performance always gives rise to a unique solution. Unfortunately this property does not hold for the general case, as we can see from gure 1. In this gure we see that the curves f 3 4 and f 3 5 intersect at some point 4 ; a approximately 3.2,6.5. From 5 we therefore conclude that at this point for both solutions we h a v e that 1 + 2 + 3 = 4 + a . N o w, choose the parameters b i and r i such that s 1 = s 2 = s 3 = 1 and consequently, q 1 = 9 ; q 2 = 8 and q 3 = 5. Then k i = i and consequently the cost player i has at this equilibrium is x 2 0 i . So, the aggregate cost is x 2 0 1 + 2 + 3 . Consequently, a t a = a t w o di erent solutions yield the same aggregate cost, which i s o b viously see gure 1 again also the minimum attainable aggregate cost in this case.
V. Uniqueness versus the numb e r o f p l a y ers
Next we consider the in uence of the number of players on the uniqueness conditions we derived in the previous section. We address the question whether the parameter set for a for which there is a unique solution to ARE, increases if the number of players increases. This would sustain the intuition that in a noncooperative game it becomes more di cult to reach an agreement in case the number of players increases.
To analyze this problem we i n troduce for a xed sequence 1 2 ::: N :::, the set U N := faj ARE has a unique positive solutiong. The following lemma i s a n immediate consequence of an exhaustive analyses of theorem 9. Comparing 1 and 2, elementary analysis shows that for N large enough, condition 3 of lemma 11 will be satis ed.
2
Remark 13: Since f N i x f N +1 i x; i= 1 ; ::; 2 N , in principle the set U N shifts to the right. Therefore, in the case illustrated in gure 2, we h a v e that by taking here all i for i 3 approximately zero, U N will never be included in U N +1 . W e illustrated this phenomenon in gure 4. So, the assumption in theorem 12 that 0 is essential.
IV. Concluding remarks
In this paper we studied the positive solutions of the algebraic Riccati equations that play an important role in the study of limiting stationary feedback Nash equilibria in the N-player linear quadratic scalar di erential game. We showed that this set of equations always has a nite number of di erent positive solutions and that this number is bounded by 2 N , 1. In particular we analyzed the set of state parameters for which the ARE have a unique solution. Fixing all other system parameters, we s a w that this set is either a half line or the union of a half line and an open bounded interval. We showed how this set can be determined from the analysis of two scalar functions. It turned out that for all stable systems there will always be a unique solution to the ARE equations. In this respect it is interesting to recall from the two-player case see Engwerda 1999-b that whenever the system is not stable, there always exist combinations of the remaining system parameters such that the ARE have more than one positive solutions.
On the other hand we showed that there is always a threshold such that if the state feedback parameter exceeds this threshold assuming all other system parameters again xed, the number of positive solutions will not increase. In general this number of positive solutions is 2 N , 1.
In between these two limiting cases, the number of solutions gradually increases from 1 to this maximum number if the system feedback parameter grows. However, this increase is in general not monotonically. So, roughly spoken, the conclusion is that the larger the instability of the system is, the more positive solutions the ARE equations will have. The above outcomes raise a couple of new questions. Two of them are, rst, whether aggregate e ciency can be used as an additional constraint to determine a unique equilibrium amongst all solutions of the ARE. We showed in an example that this is not the case. Second, whether the set of parameters for which there will be a unique equilibrium will always increase if the number of players in the game increases.
In general the answer to this second question is negative too. Only in case some parameter condition is satis ed, which can be interpreted as that the new players really have both an interest
